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Article
Asset Freezing at the European and
Inter-American Courts of Human
Rights: Lessons for the International
Criminal Court, the United Nations
Security Council and States
Daley J. Birkett*
ABSTRACT
This article examines the human rights implications of the asset freezing processes avail-
able to the International Criminal Court and theUnitedNations SecurityCouncil. It does
so through the lens of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, from whose jurisprudence, although not uniform, a
number of principles can be distilled. By scrutinising a series of cases decided under the
European Convention on Human Rights and American Convention on Human Rights,
respectively, the article demonstrates that the rights to the peaceful enjoyment of property
and to respect for one’s private and family life, home and correspondence are necessarily
implicated by the execution of asset freezing measures in criminal and administrative
contexts. The article concludes that, considering the human rights constraints placed on
the exercise of their powers, both the International Criminal Court and United Nations
Security Council, as well as States acting at their request, must pay attention to this case
law with a view to respecting the human rights of those to whom asset freezing measures
are applied.
KEYWORDS: right to property, right to family life and home, asset freezing, European
Court of Human Rights, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, International Criminal
Court, United Nations Security Council
1. INTRODUCTION
Both the International Criminal Court (ICC or ‘Court’) and United Nations Security
Council (UNSC) have the power to ask States to freeze assets. The former has the
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authority to do so with respect to the States Parties to its constituent instrument, the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (‘the Rome Statute’).1 ICC States
Parties are obliged to cooperate with the Court in this area,2 while the Court is also
able to issue requests for the freezing of assets to non-party States. The latter have
no duty to cooperate with the ICC unless the UNSC imposes such an obligation in
accordance with the referral power granted to it by Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute3
or if a duty exists ‘on the basis of an ad hoc arrangement [between the ICC and a non-
party State], an agreement with such State or any other appropriate basis’.4 As for the
UNSC’s capacity to compel States to freeze assets, this power stems from Chapter VII
of theCharter of theUnitedNations (‘theUNCharter’), Article 41 of which empowers
the UNSC to take measures short of authorising the use of armed force to enforce its
decisions.5 Pursuant toArticle 25 of theUNCharter, all UnitedNations (UN)member
states are obliged to ‘accept and carry out’ UNSC decisions.6 Both procedures involve
individuals’ assets being frozen by States. To this extent, therefore, both also necessarily
implicate human rights on the part of the individuals subjected to the asset freezing
measures, whether the assets are frozen in accordance with a request by the ICC or a
decision made by the UNSC.
Although there is a difference between the asset freezing powers available to the ICC
andUNSC, with the former being part of a criminal process and the latter consisting of
administrative measures, both bodies are constrained by human rights in the exercise
of their respective powers. As for the ICC, whose asset freezing powers are tied to the
questionof the criminal responsibility of the accused and therefore subject to the checks
and balances applicable to criminal procedures, including fair trial considerations,
Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute stipulates that the application and interpretation of
its applicable law must be ‘consistent with internationally recognised human rights’.7
Sluiter has therefore argued that Article 21(3) should occupy a ‘prominent place as a
systematic and obligatory human rights review standard for each and every activity of
1 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 1998, 2187 UNTS 90.
2 Article 86 Rome Statute (‘States Parties shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Statute, cooperate
fully with the Court in its investigation and prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court’).
See also Article 93(1)(k) Rome Statute regarding the explicit obligation for States Parties to cooperate
with respect to ‘[t]he identification, tracing and freezing or seizure of proceeds, property and assets and
instrumentalities of crimes for the purpose of eventual forfeiture, without prejudice to the rights of bona
fide third parties’.
3 Article 13 Rome Statute (‘The Court may exercise its jurisdiction with respect to a crime referred to in
article 5 in accordance with the provisions of this Statute if . . . (b) A situation in which one or more of
such crimes appears to have been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting
under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations’). In such situations, the obligation for non-party
States to cooperate with the ICC would stem not from the Rome Statute, but from the UNCharter.
4 Article 87(5) Rome Statute.
5 Article 41 Charter of the United Nations 1945, 1 UNTS 16.
6 Article 25 UNCharter.
7 Article 21(3) Rome Statute. The full provision reads ‘The application and interpretation of law pursuant to
this article must be consistent with internationally recognized human rights, and be without any adverse
distinction founded on grounds such as gender as defined in article 7, paragraph 3, age, race, colour,
language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, wealth, birth or other
status.’
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theCourt and activity that is of benefit to theproceedings before theCourt’.8 In a similar
manner, Article 24(2) of the UN Charter requires that the UNSC ‘act in accordance
with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations’ in discharging its duties.9
Article 1(3) of the UN Charter, which lists three of the four purposes of the
organisation, includes ‘promoting and encouraging respect for human rights’.10 UNSC-
requested asset freezing measures, which are ordered at the behest of the UNSC, albeit
subject to the legal constraints on UNSC action detailed in Article 24(2) of the UN
Charter and by peremptory norms of international law,11 must consequently also
be constrained by human rights. This article examines the principal human rights
implicated by both processes through the lens of a series of cases decided by the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR or ‘Strasbourg Court’) and the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR or ‘San José Court’) under the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)12 and the American Convention on Human
Rights (ACHR),13 respectively.
Further to the relationship between the application of ICC-requested and UNSC-
ordered asset freezing measures and human rights, the ECtHR also provides an espe-
cially apt lens through which to conduct the present enquiry because the ICC regularly
refers to the legal findings of theStrasbourg court in its owncase law.14 At the same time,
although certain international(ised) criminal tribunals (ICTs) established before the
entry into force of the Rome Statute were authorised by their constituent instruments
to order provisional and/or post-conviction asset freezing measures,15 such measures
8 See Sluiter, ‘Human rights protection in the ICC pre-trial phase’ in Stahn and Sluiter (eds), The Emerging
Practice of the International Criminal Court (2008) 459 at 475.
9 Article 24(2) UNCharter.
10 Article 1(3) UNCharter.
11 Article 24(2) UN Charter (‘In discharging these duties the Security Council shall act in accordance with
the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. The specific powers granted to the Security Council
for the discharge of these duties are laid down in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII’). See also de Wet, The
Chapter VII Powers of the United Nations Security Council (2004) at 187–91 (on jus cogens as a substantive
limit to UNSC discretion), 191–5 (on the purposes and principles of the UN as substantive limits to the
powers of the UNSC), 219–26 (on human rights limitations to economic sanctions); de Wet, ‘Human
Rights Limitations to Economic Enforcement Measures Under Article 41 of the UNCharter and the Iraqi
Sanctions Regime’ (2001) 14 Leiden Journal of International Law 284 at 286–9; Schweigman,The Authority
of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (2001) at 172, 202; Tzanakopoulos,Disobeying
the Security Council: Countermeasures against Wrongful Sanctions (2011) at 31–2; Orakhelashvili, ‘The
Impact of Peremptory Norms on the Interpretation and Application of United Nations Security Council
Resolutions’ (2005) 16 European Journal of International Law 59 at 63–7 (for fundamental human rights as
constraints, see 64–6);Whittle, ‘The Limits of Legality and theUnitedNations SecurityCouncil: Applying
the Extra-Legal Measures Model to Chapter VII Action’ (2015) 26 European Journal of International Law
671.
12 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950, 213 UNTS 221.
13 American Convention on Human Rights 1969, 1144 UNTS 123.
14 On this practice, see Croquet, ‘The International Criminal Court and the Treatment of Defence Rights: A
Mirror of the European Court of Human Rights’ Jurisprudence?’ (2011) 11Human Rights Law Review 91;
Jones, ‘Insights Into an Emerging Relationship: Use of Human Rights Jurisprudence at the International
Criminal Court’ (2016) 16 Human Rights Law Review 701; Lobba and Mariniello (eds), Judicial Dialogue
on Human Rights: The Practice of International Criminal Tribunals (2017).
15 The International Military Tribunal was explicitly empowered to order post-conviction forfeiture, the
International Military Tribunal for the Far East was arguably authorised to do so, the tribunals estab-
lished under Control Council Law No. 10 were permitted to order fines as well as provisional and post-
conviction forfeiture measures, while the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and
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were barely used in practice.16 As a result, there is limited discussion of the relationship
between the applicationof thesemeasures and their consequent impact on fundamental
human rights in the jurisprudenceof the ICTs that predate the ICC. In addition, because
the Court has seen relatively few cases proceed to the sentencing phase, while other
accused and/or convicted persons have been found to be indigent and many filings
remain confidential, the ICC has developed only a relatively limited jurisprudence on
the execution of asset freezing measures.17
This is not to say that this issue is not of significant import for theCourt’s activities in
the future. As will be demonstrated in this article, the application of such measures has
been contested before the ICC’s pre-trial, trial and appeals chambers, with the impact
of these measures on the human rights guaranteed under the Rome Statute regularly
under discussion. Why thenmight the case law of the ECtHR and IACtHR be relevant
for theUNSC?Aswill be discussed in this article, the execution ofUNSC-ordered asset
freezingmeasures has been determined to have violated the ECHR in certain cases. The
efficacy of these measures, at least in the territories of the High Contracting Parties
to the ECHR, therefore, depends upon their compatibility with the rights protected
therein. As to the IACtHR, its case law sheds light on a subject of immediate relevance
to the operations of the ICC, namely the impact upon human rights caused by the
mismanagement of assets frozen at the Court’s request.
The article demonstrates that the case law of the ICC has, by and large, complied
with the human rights principles identified but could benefit from clearer reasoning
as to why the ICC elected to rely upon the jurisprudence of a particular regional
human rights court. As for UNSC-ordered asset freezes, the article shows that the UN
organ vested with ‘primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace
and security’18 is given a wide margin of appreciation in framing such measures. At
the same time, however, there is a risk that UN Member States, in executing UNSC-
requested measures, could be found to have violated the human rights protected in
regional instruments to which they are parties.
2. ASSET FREEZING INTHELAWANDPRACTICEOFTHE STRASBOURG
ANDSAN JOSÉCOURTS
At the outset, it is important to note the difference between provisional measures with
a view to possible forfeiture and post-conviction forfeiture measures, both of which
require assets to be frozen by States. The former are protective measures, explicitly
designed to safeguard any assets that might later be subject to an order for forfeiture
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda had similar powers, without the capacity to order fines as a
penalty.
16 Ibid.
17 On which, see Ferstman, ‘Cooperation and the International Criminal Court: The Freezing, Seizing
and Transfer of Assets for the Purpose of Reparations’ in Bekou and Birkett (eds), Cooperation and the
International Criminal Court: Perspectives from Theory and Practice (2016) 227 at 233–7; Birkett, ‘Pre-Trial
“Protective Measures for the Purpose of Forfeiture” at the International Criminal Court: Safeguarding and
Balancing Competing Rights and Interests’ (2019) 32 Leiden Journal of International Law 585 at 593–601.
18 Article 24(1) UNCharter.
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(or, in the Rome Statute system, an order for reparations to victims),19 while the latter
constitute a penalty imposed by a criminal court following a guilty verdict. Both types
of measures have been brought to the attention of the ECtHR,20 from which a series
of principles useful to the work of the ICC, chiefly as concerns the application and
interpretation of its applicable law consistent with internationally recognised human
rights, can be gleaned. Similarly, the execution of UNSC sanctions, including asset
freezing procedures, has been challenged in Strasbourg. In addition, the IACtHR has
also examined the human rights implications of the mismanagement of assets frozen at
the request of responsible domestic authorities.
The principles developed by the two human rights courts in this context will also
be examined with a view to identifying their potential for promoting and encouraging
respect for human rights by the UNSC and, more specifically, by UNMember States in
their national implementationof the administrative asset freezingmeasures requested at
the international level. This is because UNSC resolutions ordering UNMember States
to freeze the assets of individuals (and entities) included on sanctions lists are not self-
executing.21 Nor are ICC-issued cooperation requests for the freezing of assets capable
of self-execution.22 Rather, such requests,whether theyoriginate from theUNSCor the
Court, require (legislative) action by the receiving States to give effect to the measures
in their national legal orders.
Another important difference that ought to be acknowledged is that between the
purpose of asset freezingmeasures executedbyStates basedon a request from theCourt
and the aims of asset freezing under the auspices of UNSC sanctions regimes. At the
Court, one can identify several such purposes, including the prevention of ongoing
or future criminal conduct under ICC jurisdiction, the preservation of assets for the
payment of future fines, orders for forfeiture, or orders to make reparations to victims
and the payment of defence fees. While the UNSC has also requested States to give
effect to asset freezingmeasures against individuals under the guise of so-called targeted
sanctions,23 someofwhich couldbe said topremisedon similar purposes to thoseof the
Court in seeking to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of mass atrocities,24 the
19 Article 75(2) Rome Statute (‘The Court may make an order directly against a convicted person specifying
appropriate reparations to, or in respect of, victims, including restitution, compensation and rehabilitation’).
On the development of the ICC’s case law concerning the request of provisional asset freezing measures
to safeguard assets for the enforcement of possible future reparations orders, see Ferstman, supra n 17 at
233–6; Birkett, supra n 17 at 594–7.
20 For protective measures, see the discussion of Dzˇinic´ v Croatia, infra Section 2A(i); for post-conviction
forfeiture measures, see, for example, Varvara v Italy, infra n 37.
21 SeeGowlland-Debbas, ‘Implementing Sanctions Resolutions inDomestic Law’ inGowlland-Debbas (ed.),
National Implementation of United Nations Sanctions: A Comparative Study (2004) 33 at 35.
22 See Article 88 Rome Statute (‘States Parties shall ensure that there are procedures available under their
national law for all of the forms of cooperation which are specified under this Part’). For discussion of this
important provision, see Bekou, ‘A Case for Review of Article 88, ICC Statute: Strengthening a Forgotten
Provision’ (2009) 12New Criminal Law Review 468.
23 SeeBiersteker, Eckert andTourinho (eds),Targeted Sanctions:The Impacts andEffectiveness ofUnitedNations
Action (2016).
24 The measures, which have included asset freezes, have been labelled ‘crime-based targeted sanctions’: see
Roskam, ‘Crime-Based Targeted Sanctions: Promoting Respect for International Humanitarian Law by the
Security Council’ in 19 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 2016 89. The UNSC has ordered such
measures in a number of situations, including in Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the
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freezing of assets pursuant to UNSC resolutions can also serve other varied purposes.
These have included, among others, deterring the proliferation and alleged testing of
nuclear weapons,25 denouncing amilitary coup26 and condemning repeated violations
of ceasefire arrangements by armed groups.27 This distinction might be relevant in
determining whether themeasures comply with the human rights principles applicable
to asset freezing, particularly in the appraisal of whether the implementation of such
measures satisfies the ‘general interest’ or ‘legitimate aim’ criterion.28
It is also important to note the differences between the freezing of assets on the one
hand and the identification, tracing, seizure and (forms of) forfeiture and confiscation
thereof on the other.29 Distinguishing these types of measures ought to clarify the
terminology employed in the ensuing analysis of the case law of the ECtHR and
IACtHR as regards asset freezing and its implications for the ICC, the UNSC and the
States party to the Rome Statute and UNCharter. According to guidance approved by
the UNSC Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee:30
Freeze of funds and other financial assets and economic resources includes pre-
venting their use, alteration, movement, transfer or access . . . . Freeze of eco-
nomic resources also includes preventing their use to obtain funds, goods, or
services in any way, including, but not limited to, by selling, hiring or mortgaging
them. The term ‘freeze’ does not mean confiscation or transfer of ownership.31
The identification and/or tracing of assets are steps that may need to be taken prelim-
inary to their freezing. After freezing, assets may, but need not necessarily, be seized,
forfeited and/or confiscated.As the foregoingAl-QaidaSanctionsCommittee guidance
stipulates, UNSC-requested asset freezes do not require the confiscation or transfer of
ownership of the assets by UN Member States.32 In the Rome Statute system, the
ICC can only request the forfeiture of assets in the event of a conviction33 and the
‘identification, tracing and freezing or seizure of proceeds, property and assets and
Central African Republic and Libya. This said, it ought to be noted that the UNSC measures, although
arguably ‘crime-based’, remain administrative.
25 See UNSC Sanctions Committee established pursuant to SC Res 1718, 14 October 2006, S/RES/1718
(2006) (concerning the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea).
26 SeeUNSCSanctionsCommittee established pursuant to SCRes 2048, 18May 2012, S/RES/2048 (2012)
(concerning Guinea-Bissau).
27 See UNSC Sanctions Committee established pursuant to SC Res 2374, 5 September 2017, S/RES/2374
(2017) (concerningMali).
28 See infra Section 2A(i).
29 Cf. Article 93(1)(k) Rome Statute.
30 UNSCSanctionsCommittee establishedpursuant to SCRes 1267, 15October 1999, S/RES/1267 (1999),
SC Res 1989, 17 June 2011, S/RES/1989 (2011) and SC Res 2253, 17 December 2015, S/RES/2253
(2015) (concerning the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) (Da’esh), Al-Qaida, and associated
individuals, groups, undertakings and entities) (Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee).
31 Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee, ‘Assets Freeze: Explanation of Terms’, 24 February 2015, at paras 9–11
(emphases in original).
32 Ibid. at para 11.
33 Cf. Article 75(2) Rome Statute (‘In addition to imprisonment, the Court may order . . . (b) A forfeiture of
proceeds, property and assets derived directly or indirectly from that crime, without prejudice to the rights
of bona fide third parties’).
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instrumentalities of crimes’34 canbe requested ‘for thepurposeof eventual forfeiture’.35
In other words, where an acquittal is entered, there is no legal basis for an order for
forfeiture of assets by the Court.
Muchof theECtHR’s case lawconcerning asset freezinghasdeveloped in the context
of challenges brought in the context of forfeiture proceedings, which take a number of
forms at the domestic level.36 But this does not mean that the ECtHR has necessarily
developed a thorough approach thereto. In the words of Judge Pinto de Albuquerque:
Under the nomen juris of confiscation, the States have introduced ante delictum
criminal prevention measures, criminal sanctions (accessory or even principal
criminal penalties), security measures in the broad sense, administrative mea-
sures adopted within or outside criminal proceedings, and civil measures in
rem. Confronted with this enormous range of responses available to the State,
the Court has not yet developed any consistent case-law based on principled
reasoning.37
The following section analyses this case law in respect of two rights protected under the
ECHR and ACHR frameworks with which the imposition of asset freezing measures
necessarily interferes, namely the right to the peaceful enjoyment of one’s possessions
and the right to respect for one’s private and family life, home and correspondence. A
second justification for focusing on these rights is that both have been subject to judicial
scrutiny in cases brought before the ECtHR and IACtHR by applicants challenging
the implementation of asset freezing measures by State authorities. This is not to say
34 Article 93(1)(k) Rome Statute.
35 Ibid.
36 See Simonato, ‘Confiscation and fundamental rights across criminal and non-criminal domains’ (2017) 18
ERA Forum 365 at 366 (‘Assets may be confiscated even if they are not proceeds of the crime for which
the offender has been convicted (extended confiscation), if they belong to persons other than the offender
(third party confiscation), or if they are the proceeds of an offence which has not been proven at trial (non-
conviction based confiscation); in some cases, even if criminal proceedings against the suspect have not
started at all (civil asset forfeiture)’).On ‘extended confiscation’, seeBoucht,TheLimits of Asset Confiscation:
On the Legitimacy of Extended Appropriation of Criminal Proceeds (2017); Boucht, ‘Extended Confiscation:
Criminal Assets or Criminal Owners’ in Ligeti and Simonato (eds), Chasing Criminal Money: Challenges
and Perspectives on Asset Recovery in the EU (2017) 117; Simonato, ‘Extended Confiscation of Criminal
Assets: Limits and Pitfalls of Minimum Harmonisation in the EU’ (2016) 41 European Law Review 727.
On ‘third party confiscation’, see Blanco Cordero, ‘Modern Forms of Confiscation and Protection of Third
Parties’ in Ligeti and Simonato (eds),Chasing Criminal Money: Challenges and Perspectives on Asset Recovery
in the EU (2017) 139. On ‘non-conviction-based confiscation’, see Rui and Sieber (eds), Non-Conviction-
Based Confiscation in Europe: Possibilities and Limitations on Rules Enabling Confiscation without a Criminal
Conviction (2016);King, ‘Civil Forfeiture andArticle 6 of theECHR:DueProcess Implications for England
&Wales and Ireland’ (2014) 34 Legal Studies 371; Hendry and King, ‘How far is too far? Theorising non-
conviction-based asset forfeiture’ (2015) 11 International Journal of Law in Context 398. On ‘civil asset
forfeiture’, see Boucht, ‘Civil Asset Forfeiture and the Presumption of Innocence underArticle 6(2) ECHR’,
(2014) 5New Journal of European Criminal Law 221.
37 Varvara v Italy Application No 17475/09, Merits, 29 October 2013, at Partly Concurring and Partly
DissentingOpinion of Judge PintoDeAlbuquerque, 14. See also Simonato, ‘Confiscation and fundamental
rights across criminal and non-criminal domains’, ibid. at 366 (‘Human rights law . . . has not yet provided
a firm answer to all questions arising about the compatibility of new forms of confiscationwith fundamental
rights’).
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that these are the only relevant rights in this context. Indeed, the right to a fair trial,
particularly as it concerns the presumption of innocence, is also implicated and will
be considered alongside the analysis of the two principal rights under examination
where relevant. A further reason behind focusing on these rights is that both have been
discussed by the ICC in its case law on the execution of asset freezing measures. The
analysis therefore also aims to distil principles from the Strasbourg and San JoséCourts’
case law relevant to the execution of asset freezing measures by States at the request of
the ICC and UNSC, respectively.
A. Protection of Property
One human right that is evidently implicated by the imposition of asset freezing
measures can be found in the (first) Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (‘Protocol 1’):38
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his posses-
sions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest
and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of
international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a
State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property
in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other
contributions or penalties.39
This right is also enshrined in Article 21 of the ACHR in the following terms:
1. Everyone has the right to the use and enjoyment of his property. The law may
subordinate such use and enjoyment to the interest of society.
2. No one shall be deprived of his property except upon payment of just com-
pensation, for reasons of public utility or social interest, and in the cases and
according to the forms established by law.
(i) Dzˇinic´ v Croatia
The impact of protective (that is, pre-conviction) asset freezing measures on the right
to the peaceful enjoyment of one’s possessions came to the attention of the ECtHR in
Dzˇinic´ v Croatia,40 a case involving the provisional seizure of the applicant’s property
with a view to securing the enforcement of a potential future order for forfeiture.41
The applicant had been charged with the misappropriation of shares and the misuse of
company assets and facilities, which allegedly led to a pecuniary gain of approximately
onemillion EURO.42 This gainwas later found to be roughly 240,000EURO,43 but the
38 1952, 213 UNTS 262.
39 Article 1 Protocol 1 ECHR.
40 Dzˇinic´ v Croatia Application No 38359/13, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 17May 2016.
41 Ibid. at para 14.
42 Ibid. at para 9.
43 Ibid. at para 31.
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domestic court refused to lift the seizure order,44 despite the total value of the property
seized from the applicant being closer to 10millionEURO.45 The applicant brought his
complaint to the ECtHR, with the matter for determination by the Strasbourg Court
being whether the disproportionate asset seizure infringed his Protocol 1 right to the
peaceful enjoyment of his possessions.46
It is notable that the parties did not dispute whether the seizure of the applicant’s
property constituted an interference with his possessions.47 On the contrary, both
parties were of the view, confirmed by the ECtHR,48 that Article 1 of Protocol 1 was
necessarily implicated by the seizure of property in his possession—that is, assets of
whichhewas the lawful owner—‘byprohibiting its alienationor encumbrance’.49 In the
words of the ECtHR: ‘the seizure of property for legal proceedings normally relates to
the control of the use of property, which falls within the ambit of the second paragraph
of Article 1 of Protocol No 1 to the Convention’.50 In addition, the ECtHR expressed
the following view in relation to protective, pre-conviction asset seizure measures:
[T]he seizure of the applicant’s property did not purport to deprive him of his
possessions but placed a temporary restriction on its use . . . which, in circum-
stances where the disposition of the property was associated with the applicant’s
lawful business, also inevitably affected the capacities of his business activity
. . . . [It is also] important to note that the seizure of the applicant’s property
was applied as a provisional measure aimed at securing enforcement of a possible
confiscationorder imposed at theoutcomeof the criminal proceedings in relation
to the obtained proceeds of crime . . . 51
The freezing of individuals’ assets by States at the request of the ICC and UNSC
therefore infringes upon the ECHR protected right to the peaceful enjoyment of one’s
possessions and, as a result,must be justified. It is important to reiterate here thatUNSC
decisions that States must freeze assets need not be taken with a view to their eventual
forfeiture during criminal proceedings.52 Nevertheless, it is argued that the principles
that can be deduced from the case law of the ECtHR might also have consequences
for the implementation of freezing measures executed under the auspices of UNSC
targeted sanctions and therefore ought to be analysed alongside their application to the
Rome Statute system. For example, the ECtHR could find a High Contracting Party
to the ECHR, all of whom are also UNMember States, to have violated the ECHR in
attempting to give domestic effect to UNSC-requested asset freezing measures, if the
State’s national implementing legislation fails to adhere to the principles detailed in the
44 Ibid. at para 32
45 Ibid. at para 27. The total value of the property seized from the applicant (ten plots of land, two houses, and
a commercial building) was estimated at 9,887,084 EURO: see ibid. at para 12.
46 Ibid. at para 42.
47 Ibid. at para 59.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid. at para 60.
51 Ibid. at para 61 (emphases added).
52 See supra nn 23–27.
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ECtHR’s jurisprudence.53 It is to these principles, groupedunder four headings, namely
(i) time limits; (ii) legality; (iii) legitimate aim; and (iv) proportionality, that the focus
of analysis now shifts.
Time limits. In Dzˇinic´ v Croatia, the ECtHR stressed that protective, pre-conviction
measures carried out with a view to the prospective forfeiture of the assets in question
are of an impermanent nature. Both ICC and UNSC-requested asset freezing mea-
sures are customarily time limited and are thus comparable with the seizure under
discussion. As for the UNSC, although the body has broad discretion in deciding on
which measures are to be employed to give effect to its decisions under Chapter VII
and, more specifically, Article 41 of the UN Charter,54 the UNSC has rarely imposed
targeted financial sanctions without specifying an end date or, at least, ‘a commitment
to review’ the measures.55 Boon compares UNSC sanctions to counter-terrorism leg-
islation adopted in states of emergency because they are aimed at addressing security
related situations.56 In her view, as ‘derogations from the normof co-existence and State
sovereignty, there is a powerful argument that coercive measures must be inherently
time bound and departures from this premisemust be supported by [theUNSC] in the
form of renewals’.57 Should the UNSC be of the opinion that the situation to which it
had responded by imposing asset freezing measures no longer merits their application,
that body can, of course, terminate the measures under Chapter VII.
As for the ICC, protective asset freezingmeasures are given effect by States following
a request for cooperation issued thereto by the Court, which has discussed their
termination in the following terms:
[A]n acquittal or other cessation of proceedings does not render the original
cooperation requests nor the coercivemeasures invalid, null or void. The cooper-
ation requests issued in this case remain, but cease to have effect in the sense that
States are no longer required to comply with them, for instance by keeping any
assets frozen. This, however, does notmean that assets are automatically released
in the requested State. It is rather for the State to determine what action to take
53 As deWet, FromKadi toNada: Judicial Techniques FavouringHumanRights overUnitedNations Security
Council Sanctions’ (2013) 12 Chinese Journal of International Law 787 at 806, notes: ‘theNada decision of
the ECtHR has indicated that even where the language of a UNSC resolution leaves no apparent scope for
interpretation, States remain under an obligation to find a way to give some effect to international human
rights standards’.
54 SeeOrakhelashvili,Collective Security (2011) at 189–91;Tadic´ ICTY-94-1,Decisionon theDefenceMotion
for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Appeals Chamber, 2October 1995, at para 31 (‘Once the Security
Council determines that a particular situation poses a threat to the peace or that there exists a breach of the
peace or an act of aggression, it enjoys a wide margin of discretion in choosing the course of action’).
55 Boon, ‘TimingMatters: Termination Policies for UN Sanctions’ in van denHerik (ed.), ResearchHandbook
on UN Sanctions and International Law (2017) 236 at 239–42 (discussing three termination methods
for UNSC sanctions: (i) resolutions with sunset clauses; (ii) resolutions with no expiry date; and (iii)
resolutions with a commitment to review). Boon observes (at 240) that the third option is the most
frequently used option by the UNSC in the 41 resolutions forming the subject of her analysis, with the
second option the least frequently employed.
56 Ibid. at 247.
57 Ibid.
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under domestic law as a result of the conclusion of its obligation to assist the
Court through the freezing of assets.58
Asset freezing measures, whether implemented by States at the request of the ICC or
the UNSC, consequently ought to be provisional restrictions.
This is not to say that the temporary asset freezes imposed at the respective request
of the ICC and UNSC cannot endure for many years. For example, at the ICC, assets
belonging to Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo were frozen in the weeks after his arrest on 24
May 2008.59 Following his acquittal on 8 June 2018, counsel for Mr Bemba submitted
that ‘[t]here is no legal basis to continue to freeze [his] assets’.60 According to a recent
filing lodged at the ICC by counsel forMr Bemba, all of these assets remained frozen as
of December 2018, more than 10 years after his arrest and almost 5 months following
his acquittal.61 The application of long-term asset freezingmeasures can also been seen
at the UNSC, where, by way of example, the asset freeze by States at the behest of the
UNSC against a number of the children of former Libyan leader Muammar Gadhafi,
as a result of their association with their father’s regime, has endured since 26 February
2011.62 These measures remain in force as of December 2019,63 despite their father’s
death, and the overthrow of his regime, on 20 October 2011.
The protracted application of asset freezing measures could potentially call into
question their classification as temporary or provisional restrictions. Such a concern
was expressed by the European Union (EU) General Court in Yassin Abdullah Kadi v
58 Situation in the Central African Republic ICC-01/05–01/08–3660-Red2, Public redacted version of ‘Deci-
sion on Mr Bemba’s preliminary application for reclassification of filings, disclosure, accounts, and partial
unfreezing ofMr Bemba’s assets and the Registry’s Request for guidance’, 18 October 2018, Trial Chamber
III, 20 November 2018, at para 13.
59 See Situation in the Central African Republic ICC-01/05–01/08–3654-Red, Public Redacted Version of
‘Preliminary application for reclassification of filings, disclosure, accounts and partial unfreezing of Mr
Bemba’s assets’, Trial Chamber III, 30 October 2018, at paras 7–9.
60 Ibid. at para 25.
61 See Situation in the Central African Republic ICC-01/05–01/08–3663-Red, Public Redacted Version of
‘Urgent request for partial reconsideration and associated orders’, Trial Chamber III, 10 December 2018, at
para 1 (‘In the 22days sinceTrialChamber III’s [20November 2018] “Decision onMrBemba’s preliminary
application for reclassification of filings, disclosure, accounts, and partial unfreezing of Mr Bemba’s assets
and the Registry’s Request for guidance”, not one of the assets (whether in the name of Mr Bemba or
somebody else) in Portugal, Belgium, or the Democratic Republic of Congo (“the States”) has been
returned to its owner. Mr Bemba has received no direct communication from the States, nor indeed are
any of them apparently prepared to entertain such communication’. Footnote omitted).
62 For example, the asset freezes (and travel bans) imposed at the request of the UNSC Sanctions Committee
established by SC Res 1970, 26 February 2011, S/RES/1970 (2011) (concerning Libya) with respect to
Muammar Gadhafi’s daughter, Aisha, and two of his sons, Mohammed Muammar and Hannibal, remain
in force as of October 2019. See UNSC, ‘Consolidated United Nations Security Council Sanctions List’,
available at: scsanctions.un.org/consolidated/ [last accessed 22 June 2020]. All three were listed by the
UNSC Sanctions Committee because of their proximity to their father’s regime, rather than any alleged
involvement in the perpetuation of the civil war. See UNSC, ‘Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing’,
available at: www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/narrative-summaries [last accessed 22 June 2020].
Compare the reasons for the listing two of Gaddafi’s other sons, Khamis and Saadi, who, in addition to their
closeness to the regime, were listed because of their ‘Command of military units involved in repression of
demonstrations.’ Ibid.
63 Ibid.
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European Commission,64 which, in turn, cited a report by the UN High Commissioner
for Human Rights for the UNGeneral Assembly.65 According to the General Court, it
might be asked whether,
given that now nearly 10 years have passed since the applicant’s funds were
originally frozen—it is not now time to call into question the finding . . . accord-
ing to which the freezing of funds is a temporary precautionary measure that,
unlike confiscation, does not affect the very substance of the right of the persons
concerned to property in their financial assets but only the use thereof. . . . In
the scale of a human life, 10 years in fact represent a substantial period of time
and the question of the classification of the measures in question as preventative
or punitive, protective or confiscatory, civil or criminal seems now to be an open
one.66
This human rights concern could have implications for the length of ICC proceedings,
to which the duration of protective measures is tied, as well as UNSC ordered asset
freezes, whichmaybe (and, indeed, have been) subjected to challenges on the domestic,
regional and international planes, should they be renewed consecutively over many
years.67
Having found that the asset seizure implicated Article 1 of Protocol 1, the ECtHR
turned to consider the questions whether the measure was lawful,68 whether it was
executed ‘in accordance with the general interest’69 or, in other words, pursuant to a
legitimate aim,70 and whether it was proportionate—that is, ‘whether there existed
a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the
aim sought to be realised’.71 In turn, the Strasbourg Court found that the measure
was conducted in accordance with domestic law permitting their use72 and that ‘the
application of provisional measures in the context of judicial proceedings, aimed at
64 Case T-85/09 Yassin Abdullah Kadi v European Commission [2010] ECR II-5177.
65 UNHCHR, ‘Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the protection of
human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism’, 2 September 2009, A/HRC/12/22,
at para 42 (‘Because individual listings are currently open-ended in duration, theymay result in a temporary
freeze of assets becomingpermanentwhich, in turn,may amount to criminal punishment due to the severity
of the sanction. This threatens to go well beyond the purpose of the United Nations to combat the terrorist
threat posed by an individual case’). See also para 41: ‘The freezing of assets has an impact on several human
rights including the right to property. It impacts directly on the right to work and the right to freedom of
movement associated with it.’
66 Kadi, supra n 64 at para 150. See also deWet, ‘From Kadi toNada’, supra n 53 at n 42.
67 On the judicial review of UNSC sanctions and its human rights implications, which is beyond the scope of
the present article, see deWet, ‘Human Rights Considerations and the Enforcement of Targeted Sanctions
in Europe: The Emergence of Core Standards of Judicial Protection’ in Fassbender (ed.), Securing Human
Rights? Achievements and Challenges of the UN Security Council (2011); Ginsborg and Scheinin, ‘You Can’t
Always Get What You Want: The Kadi II Conundrum and the Security Council 1267 Terrorist Sanctions
Regime’ (2011) 8 Essex Human Rights Review 7.
68 Dzˇinic´ v Croatia, supra n 40 at paras 63–64.
69 Article 1 Protocol 1 ECHR.
70 Dzˇinic´ v Croatia, supra n 40 at paras 65–66.
71 Ibid. at paras 67–82.
72 Ibid. at paras 63–64.
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anticipating a possible confiscation of property, was in the “general interest” of the
community’.73
Legality. As regards the legality of asset freezing measures requested by the ICC
and UNSC, both require the requested States to give domestic effect thereto. Any
ECHR based challenge stemming from the application of ICC- or UNSC-requested
measures at the national level will therefore require an assessment of whether the
national asset freezing measures were adopted in accordance with the domestic legis-
lation enacted to give effect to the measures requested by the Court or decided upon
by the UNSC on the international plane. In Nada v Switzerland, the ECtHR observed
that ‘the impugned measures were taken pursuant to the Taliban Ordinance [that is,
Swiss legislation], adopted to implement the relevant Security Council resolutions
. . . [and] therefore had a sufficient legal basis’.74 In a similar vein, measures adopted
by States at the domestic level to give effect to ICC requests for cooperation in the
freezing of assets pursuant to Article 93(1)(k) of the Rome Statute ought to satisfy this
principle.75
Legitimate aim. As for what might constitute the ‘general interest’, in the Rome
Statute system there are several stakeholders with rights and interests invested in the
pre-trial protective measures process. These include the Prosecutor, the accused and
bona fide third parties.76 Further, Article 57(3)(e) of the Rome Statute provides that
protective measures for the purpose of forfeiture are to be taken ‘in particular for the
ultimate benefit of victims’.77 ICC pre-trial chambers must therefore take into account
the interests of all four groupsof stakeholders,which frequently fail toneatly align,when
ordering or renewing such measures.
Turning to UNSC-requested asset freezing measures, what might constitute the
‘general interest’ or ‘legitimate aim’ will necessarily relate to the purpose of the UNSC
resolutions implemented by the domestic legislation in question. For example, inNada
v Switzerland the ECtHR found that
as the relevant SecurityCouncil resolutions had been adopted to combat interna-
tional terrorism under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter (“Action with
respect to threats to thepeace, breachesof thepeace, and acts of aggression”), they
were also capable of contributing to Switzerland’s national security and public
safety.78
The responsibility of the UNSC tomaintain or restore international peace and security
under Article 24(1), Article 39 and Article 41 of the UN Charter will always provide
73 Ibid. at paras 65–66.
74 Application No 10593/0856, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 12 September 2012, at para 173.
75 For discussion of whether the ICC has taken the legality of measures into account when examining their
continued application, see infra n 133.
76 On which, see Birkett, ‘Protective Measures for the Purpose of Forfeiture’, supra n 17.
77 Article 57(3)(e) Rome Statute. See also Birkett, supra n 17.
78 Supra n 75 at para 174.
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the legal basis for the adoption of sanctions measures, whatever their specific aim
might be.79 The Strasbourg Court also held that seeking to prevent crime constituted
a legitimate aim of the UNSC sanctions under examination.80 This finding could also
have consequences for ICC-requested asset freezes, given that their aims include the
cessation and deterrence of the commission of ongoing or prospective crimes under its
jurisdiction.
Proportionality. Turning to its proportionality assessment, which represented the
majority of the analysis by the ECtHR in Dzˇinic´ v Croatia, the Strasbourg Court
noted the margin of appreciation granted to States under paragraph 2 of Article
1 of Protocol 1.81 The ECtHR then stressed that the execution of such measures,
because of their potentially significant impact on the ability of the applicant to manage
his assets, should be constrained by ‘certain procedural safeguards’.82 Additionally,
‘while any seizure or confiscation entails damage, the actual damage sustained should
not be more extensive than that which is inevitable, if it is to be compatible with
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1’.83 After analysing whether the national court had struck
a fair balance, the ECtHR concluded that the measures, although justifiable in
principle, infringed Article 1 of Protocol 1 because they were executed and remained
in force without the domestic authorities having determined whether the value
of the seized assets corresponded with the potential value of a future order for
confiscation.84
This principle ought to be relatively straightforward to apply in the ICC context:
the value of frozen and/or seized assets ought to correspond with the expected value
of a future fine, order for forfeiture or order to make reparations to victims. The ICC
has yet to issue a fine or forfeiture order outside of proceedings involving offences
against the administration of justice,85 but it has issued a small number of orders for
reparations. The sums ordered against convicted persons have been significant, despite
the indigence of each of the accused: Thomas Lubanga Dyilo was found liable for ten
79 See Article 24(1) UN Charter (‘In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its
Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for themaintenance of international peace
and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on
their behalf’). See also Article 39 UN Charter (‘The Security Council shall determine the existence of any
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide
what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international
peace and security’.).
80 Nada v Switzerland, supra n 75 at para 174.
81 Dzˇinic´ v Croatia, supra n 41 at para 68.
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid. at paras 80–81.
85 Bemba, Kilolo, Kabongo, Babala and Arido ICC-01/05–01/13–2123-Corr, Decision on Sentence pursuant
to Article 76 of the Statute, 22 March 2017, at 98–9 (imposing fines of 30,000 EURO and 300,000 EURO
on Aimé Kilolo Musamba and Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, respectively). Both fines were subsequently
confirmed in Bemba, Kilolo, Kabongo, Babala and Arido ICC-01/05–01/13–2312, Decision Re-sentencing
Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Mr Aimé Kilolo Musamba andMr Jean-Jacques Mangenda Kabongo, Trial
Chamber VII, 17 September 2018, at 50–1.
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millionUSdollars86 GermainKatanga for onemillionUSdollars,87 andAhmadAl Faqi
Al Mahdi for 2.7 million EURO.88 These sums could provide useful yardsticks against
which future requests for the freezing of assets could be measured in cases where the
accused person is not deemed to be indigent.
As for UNSC-requested asset freezes, proportional application of such measures
might be somewhat less concrete. This is because of the diverse purposes served by
the freezing of assets in accordance with UNSC resolutions.89 In such cases, it is not
unreasonable to suggest that the State(s) acting at the request of the UNSC to give
effect to the assets freeze ought to be afforded a wider margin of appreciation in their
application of the measures because of the difficulties in quantifying their potential
value.
The following section surveys another crucial aspect of the asset freezing process,
namely the (mis)management of assets after they have been frozen and seized by the
responsible domestic authorities, an issue of immediate practical relevance to the ICC.
(ii) Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez v Ecuador
The right to the use and enjoyment of property was brought to the attention of the
IACtHR in the case of Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez v Ecuador.90 This case arose
as a result of the seizure and subsequent mismanagement by Ecuadorian authorities
of a factory belonging to Mr Chaparro and a vehicle owned by Mr Lapo.91 According
to Ecuador, the seizure was performed because of the alleged involvement of the two
individuals in narcotics trafficking offences.92 In its judgment, the IACtHR elucidated
the ambit of Article 21 of the ACHR (read together with Article 1(1) ACHR93 and
Article 2 ACHR).94 Several of the principles articulated by the San José court are
86 Thomas Lubanga Dyilo ICC-01/04–01/06–3379-Red-Corr-tENG, Corrected version of the ‘Decision
Setting the Size of the Reparations Award for which Thomas Lubanga Dyilo is Liable’, Trial Chamber II, 21
December 2017, at 111.The sumwas confirmedon appeal: seeThomas LubangaDyilo ICC-01/04–01/06–
3466-Red, Judgment on the appeals against Trial Chamber II’s ‘Decision Setting the Size of the Reparations
Award for which Thomas Lubanga Dyilo is Liable’, Appeals Chamber, 18 July 2019.
87 Germain Katanga ICC-01/04–01/07–3728-tENG, Order for Reparations pursuant to Article 75 of the
Statute, Trial Chamber II, 24 March 2017, at 118. The amount was confirmed on appeal: see Germain
Katanga ICC-01/04–01/07–3778-Red, Public redacted Judgment on the appeals against the order of Trial
Chamber II of 24March 2017 entitled ‘Order for Reparations pursuant to Article 75 of the Statute’, Appeals
Chamber, 9 March 2018.
88 AhmadAl Faqi AlMahdi ICC-01/12–01/15–236, ReparationsOrder, TrialChamberVIII, 17August 2017,
at 60.
89 See supra nn 24–27.
90 IACtHR Series C 170 (2007).
91 Ibid. at para 173.
92 Ibid.
93 Article 1(1) ACHR provides as follows: ‘The States Parties to this Convention undertake to respect the
rights and freedoms recognized herein and to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free
and full exercise of those rights and freedoms, without any discrimination for reasons of race, color, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, economic status, birth, or any other
social condition’.
94 Article 2 ACHR provides as follows: ‘Where the exercise of any of the rights or freedoms referred to in
Article 1 is not already ensured by legislative or other provisions, the States Parties undertake to adopt, in
accordance with their constitutional processes and the provisions of this Convention, such legislative or
other measures as may be necessary to give effect to those rights or freedoms’.
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relevant to the practice of the ICC and UNSC as concerns the freezing of assets.
It is these principles, that is to say (i) judicial supervision; (ii) management fees
and the presumption of innocence; and (iii) prompt release, to which the article
now turns.
Judicial supervision. At the outset, it is important to note that the IACtHR did not
find the adoptionof provisional (or, in itswords, precautionary) asset freezingmeasures
to inherently constitute a violation of Article 21of the ACHR.95 This said, the San
José Court stressed the potential for a violation of the right to the use and enjoyment
of property if the responsible domestic authorities fail to ensure adequate judicial
supervision of such measures in the following terms:
[T]hese measures must be adopted and supervised by judicial officials, taking
into account that, if the reasons that justified the precautionary measure cease to
exist, the judge must assess the pertinence of maintaining the restriction, even
before the proceedings are concluded. This point is extremely important, given
that if the property ceases to fulfil a relevant role in continuing or promoting the
investigation [as required by the pertinent Ecuadorian laws], thematerial precau-
tionary measure must be lifted, because they run the risk of becoming an antic-
ipated punishment. The latter would constitute a manifestly disproportionate
restriction of the right to property.96
Management fees and thepresumptionof innocence. Asecondprinciple pronounced
by the IACtHR in Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez v Ecuador stems from the pre-
sumption of innocence, to which an accused is entitled not only under the ACHR,97
but also under a range of international human rights instruments98 and the statutes
of international(ised) criminal tribunals,99 including the Rome Statute.100 In the view
of the IACtHR, this presumption entitles an accused to protection from the appli-
cation of measures that are disproportionate, including the requirement to pay fees
incurred in the management of the assets while frozen at the behest of the State
95 Case of Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez v Ecuador, supra n 91 at para 187 (‘The Court finds that the
adoption of these measures does not constitute per se a violation of the right to property, if it is considered
that they do not signify a transfer of the ownership of the right to legal title. In this regard, the property
cannot be disposed of definitively and such disposal is restricted exclusively to its administration and
conservation and to the respective acts of investigation and management of the evidence’).
96 Ibid. at para 188.
97 Article 8(2) ACHR.
98 See Article 6(2) ECHR; Article 14(2) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, 999
UNTS 171 (ICCPR); Article 7(1)(b) African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 1981, 1520 UNTS
217; Article 7 Arab Charter on Human Rights 2004, reprinted in (2005) 12 International Human Rights
Reports 893 (Arab CHR); Article 11(1) Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, GA Res 217A (III),
A/810 (1948) at 71.
99 See Article 19(3) Statute of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals 2010, SC Res
1966 22 December 2010, S/RES/1966 (2010) at 13; Article 17(3) Statute of the Special Court for Sierra
Leone 2002, 2178 UNTS 138; Article 16(3) Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon 2007, SC Res
1757, 30May 2007, S/RES/1757 (2007) at 17.
100 Article 66 Rome Statute.
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following an acquittal. In the words of theCourt inChaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez v
Ecuador:
[T]he Court emphasises that material precautionary measures are adopted with
regard to the property of a person who is presumed innocent; hence, these
measures should not prejudice the accused disproportionately. The charges that
a person whose case has been dismissed is required to pay, with regard to the
property of which he was provisionally dispossessed, constitute a burden that is
tantamount to a sanction. This requirement is disproportionate for those persons
whose guilt has not been proved.101
Prompt release. A third principle expressed by the IACtHR concerns the length of
time allowed between the end of proceedings against accused persons and the release of
their frozen and/or seized assets before their right to the use and enjoyment of property
is violated. In the case of Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez v Ecuador, the IACtHR
held that a one-year delay between the provisional stay of the proceedings against Mr
Chaparro and the return of his property was too protracted. According to the IACtHR:
[T]he property confiscated fromMr. Chaparro should have been returned when
the reasons had disappeared that made the material precautionary measures
necessary. . . . The Court finds that this [one-year] delay in complying with the
order to return the property, which was no longer affected by a precautionary
measure, aggravatedMr. Chaparro’s situation when hewas attempting to remedy,
to someextent, the impediment to theuse and enjoyment of his property, and this
constitutes a violation of Article 21(1) of the Convention, in relation to Article
1(1) thereof, to his detriment.102
It is argued that, if asset freezingmeasures are subject to satisfactory judicial supervision
in line with the first principle articulated by the IACtHR in this case, then the prompt
release of assets at the conclusion of proceedings against the accused ought to follow
as a consequence thereof. By the same token, it is not unreasonable to propose that
the timely release of frozen assets after the proceedings against the accused person
have concluded is less likely to take place in cases where the freezing measures are
inadequately supervised by the responsible domestic authorities.
The principles expressed by the IACtHR in its discussion of Article 21 of the
ACHR in the case of Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez v Ecuador are of particular
import for the ICC, which, at the time of writing,103 remains seised with a claim
for compensation and damages filed by counsel for Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo.104 In
this filing, Mr Bemba claims a total of 42.4 million EURO from the ICC because
101 Case of Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez v Ecuador, supra n 91 at para 193.
102 Ibid. at paras 203–204.
103 This article was completed on 16 December 2019, by which time Pre-Trial Chamber II had yet to rule on
the claim.
104 Situation in the Central African Republic ICC-01/05–01/08–3673-Red, Public Redacted Version of ‘Mr.
Bemba’s claim for compensation and damages’, Pre-Trial Chamber II, 11March 2019 (‘Bemba Claim’).
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of the alleged mismanagement of his assets frozen at the Court’s request.105 Indeed,
Mr Bemba cites the IACtHR’s conclusions in the case of Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo
Íñiguez v Ecuador, namely that ‘property confiscated by the State . . . is placed in its
custody; consequently, the State assumes a position of guarantor of its good use and
conservation, particularly taking into account that precautionary measures are not of a
punitive nature’,106 in support of his submission that the ‘[f]ailure to preserve the value
of frozen property gives rise to a claim for damages’.107 In view of the ICC’s obligation
to apply and interpret its applicable law in a manner consistent with internationally
recognised human rights,108 it is the view of the present author that the Court ought
to seriously consider the discussion of Article 21 of the ACHR by the IACtHR in its
adjudicationofMrBemba’s claim. Indeed, a strict applicationof the IACtHR’s approach
might require the ICC and/or the State(s) responsible for failing to preserve the value
ofMr Bemba’s assets while frozen to award him damages, if his claims are found to have
merit. This argument finds further support in the fact that the findings of the ECtHR
inDzˇinic´ v Croatia are congruent inasmuch as both human rights courts emphasise the
threat posed to the right to the peaceful use and enjoyment of one’s property by the
protracted application of asset freezingmeasures.Without explicitly alleging a violation
thereof, another right implicated109 in Mr Bemba’s claim is that of respect for private
and family life. The following section addresses the constraints placed on the exercise
of the asset freezing powers afforded to the ICC and UNSC under the Rome Statute
and UNCharter respectively by this ECHR and ACHR-protected right.
B. Right to Respect for Private and Family Life
Article 8 of the ECHR provides as follows:
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and
his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this
right except such as is in accordancewith the law and is necessary in a democratic
society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-
being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection
of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
Article 8 of the ECHR finds its equivalent provision in Article 11 of the ACHR, titled
‘Right to Privacy’. This provision provides as follows:
1. Everyone has the right to have his honor respected and his dignity recognised.
105 Ibid. at paras 123–165.
106 Supra n 90 at para 211.
107 Bemba Claim, supra n 104 at para 136. In citing the case decided under the ACHR, Mr Bemba compares
his situation to those ofMr Chaparro andMr Lapo in that he alleges that the value of his assets significantly
decreased while they were frozen. See alsoCase of Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez v Ecuador, supra n 90
at paras 211–214.
108 Article 21(3) Rome Statute.
109 See Bemba Claim, supra n 104 at paras 2, 89–106, 117.
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2. No one may be the object of arbitrary or abusive interference with his private
life, his family, his home, or his correspondence, or of unlawful attacks on his
honor or reputation.
3. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or
attacks.
(i) Nada v Switzerland
Article 8 of the ECHR, among other rights, was implicated in Nada v Switzerland.110
This case concerned the domestic implementation of UNSC sanctions by Switzerland,
leading to a ban on the applicant, an Italian and Egyptian national who lived in an
Italian exclave surrounded by the Swiss canton of Ticino, from travelling through Swiss
territory. At the same time, the measures agreed by the UNSC Sanctions Committee
established by UNSC Resolution 1267 (1999),111 later incorporated by Switzerland
into its domestic law,112 also led to the freezing of the applicant’s assets.113 The ECtHR
recognised the potential impact of such measures on the applicant’s right to respect for
private and family life:
[T]he Court considers that the applicant could not reasonably have been
required to move from Campione d’Italia, where he had been living since 1970,
to settle in another region of Italy, especially as it cannot be ruled out that, as a
result of the freeze imposed by paragraph 1(c) of Resolution 1373 (2001) . . . ,
he could no longer dispose freely of all his property and assets. Regardless of
whether a request for authorisation to move house would have had any chance
of success, it should be pointed out that the right to respect for one’s home is
protected by Article 8 of the Convention . . . .114
Referring to, among other factors, ‘the duration of the measures imposed’,115 the
ECtHR ultimately concluded that Switzerland’s implementation of the UNSC sanc-
tionshad violated the applicant’sArticle 5 right.116 The applicant brought his complaint
110 Supra n 74.
111 SCRes 1267, 15October 1999, S/RES/1267 (1999). The sanctions regimewas extended by SCRes 1333,
19 December 2000, S/RES/1333 (2000).
112 On 2 October 2002, Switzerland passed the Ordonnance instituant des mesures à l’encontre de personnes et
entités liées à Oussama ben Laden, au groupe «Al-Qaïda» ou aux Taliban (Ordinance on Measures against
Persons and Organisations with Ties to Osama Bin Laden, the ‘Al-Qaida’ Group or the Taliban). SeeNada
v Switzerland, supra n 74 at paras 16, 66.
113 The applicant was added to the UNSC sanctions list on 9 November 2001: seeNada v Switzerland, ibid. at
para 21.
114 Nada v Switzerland, ibid. at para 190.
115 Ibid. at para 195. The ECtHR further found (ibid.) ‘that the possibility of deciding how the relevant
Security Council resolutions were to be implemented in the domestic legal order should have allowed some
alleviation of the sanctions regime applicable to the applicant, having regard to [his specific situation], in
order to avoid interference with his private and family life, without however circumventing the binding
nature of the relevant resolutions or compliance with the sanctions provided for therein.’ Reflecting on this
approach, deWet, in ‘FromKadi toNada’, supra n 53 at 806, argues that ‘[t]he presumption that the UNSC
did not intend to deviate from human rights standards seems to be almost non-rebuttable, even where it
would amount to a distortion of the text of a UNSC decision.’
116 Ibid. at para 199.
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to the Strasbourg Court largely because of the impact of the UNSC-imposed travel
ban on his ability to exercise his rights under Articles 5, 8 and 9 of the ECHR.117 The
ECtHR made no further findings with respect to the effects of the asset freeze on the
applicant’s Article 8 right to respect for private and family life. Nevertheless, the limited
dictum from the StrasbourgCourt on the potential impact of asset freezingmeasures on
the human right to respect for one’s private and family life, which encompasses the right
to respect for one’s home, is significant not only for the UNSC, and States executing
asset freezing measures requested thereby, but also for the ICC.
The ICC has requested States to freeze the assets of individuals, including real
property. Pre-Trial Chamber I issued an arrest warrant for Mr Germain Katanga on
2 July 2007.118 Four days later, the same Pre-Trial Chamber requested the national
authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) ‘to take, in accordance
with the procedures provided for in its national legislation, all necessary measures
to identify, trace, freeze or seize the property and assets of Germain Katanga on its
territory’.119 Additionally, further to the Prosecutor’s application for a warrant of arrest
for Katanga, Pre-Trial Chamber I issued another order on 5 November 2007,120 in
which it observed as follows:
[I]n its application, the Prosecution informed the Chamber that Germain
Katanga reportedly had two residences in Aveba at the time of the events . . .
and that he also [could have] be[en] expected to have retained at least some of
the fruits of the crimes in which his combatants frequently engaged; that these
assets potentially could be used to satisfy a reparation award, if such an award
is entered; and that, moreover, Germain Katanga ha[d] the means to place his
property and assets beyond the reach of the Court.121
The human rights infringed by the freezing of real property therefore has implications
for the Court,122 which must be prepared to justify any such infringement.123
117 Ibid. at para 3. The applicant also alleged a violation of Article 13 ECHR.
118 Katanga ICC-01/04–01/07–1-tENG, Warrant of Arrest for Germain Katanga, Pre-Trial Chamber, 2 July
2007.
119 Katanga ICC-01/04–01/07–7-tENG, Request to the Democratic Republic of the Congo for the purpose
of obtaining the identification, tracing, freezing and seizure of the property and assets of Germain Katanga,
Pre-Trial Chamber I, 6 July 2007, at para 3.
120 Katanga ICC-01/04–01/07–54-tENG, Order on the execution of the warrant of arrest against Germain
Katanga, Pre-Trial Chamber I, 5 November 2007.
121 Ibid. at 5.
122 In filings issued during the course of proceedings requesting to have an ICC-requested asset freeze lifted
following his acquittal for crimes against humanity and war crimes, Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo alleged
that ‘houses’ belonging to him had been frozen at the request of the Court: see Situation in the Central
African Republic ICC-01/05–01/08–3657-Red, Public Redacted version of ‘Response to Redacted version
of the Registry’s Observations on Mr Bemba’s Request for Reclassification of Information relating to Mr
Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo’s Assets’, Trial Chamber III, 30 October 2018, at para 4. See also Situation in
the Central African Republic ICC-01/05-01/08-3663-Red, Public Redacted Version of ‘Urgent request for
partial reconsideration and associated orders’, Trial Chamber III, 10December 2018, at paras 5–6, expressly
making reference to Bemba’s lack of contemporary ‘knowledge of where [frozen] houses are located’ and
‘property in the DRC’.
123 Pre-Trial Chamber I offered such a justification in the same order in respect of the warrant for the arrest
of Mr Katanga, noting that, ‘for the purpose of awarding reparations to persons with victim status in a
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(ii) The need for clear reasoning at the International Criminal Court
The ICChas explicitly referred to the law andpractice of theECtHRas regards the right
to respect for private and family life under Article 8 of the ECHR in applying Article
21(3) of its constituent instrument to the execution of asset freezingmeasures. Accord-
ing to this provision, the Court must interpret and apply its sources of applicable law
‘consistent with internationally recognised human rights’.124 Albeit not in the context
of asset freezing, in its applicationof this keyprovision ICCTrialChamberVII acknowl-
edged ‘[t]he fact that international human rights law affords a right to privacy is beyond
question and theChamber is duty bound to respect this right pursuant to Article 21(3)
of theStatute’.125 In the ensuingparagraphs,TrialChamberVII determinedwhether the
violations alleged by Aim Kilolo Musamba of his right to respect for private and family
life were effected ‘in accordance with the law’,126 having confirmed that infringements
upon the exercise of this right may only occur without violating the ECHR under such
circumstances.127
The sameTrial Chamber, albeit with Judge Bertram Schmitt sitting as a single judge,
affirmed this approach in response to a further filing by Kilolo regarding his bank
account, which had been frozen by Belgium at the request of the Court.128 Kilolo had
alleged that themeasure infringed his right to respect for private and family life because
he was unable to provide for his family financially.129 After applying the ECtHR’s
criteria concerning the circumstances in which the right can be interfered with, Judge
Schmitt rejected Kilolo’s request that his account be unfrozen.130 Consequently, in its
limited (publicly available) decisions on the application of asset freezing measures, the
Court appears to have adopted and applied the ECtHR’s criteria as determinative of
whether the freezes were executed ‘consistent with internationally recognised human
rights’ under Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute.131
case, if property and assets are not identified, located and frozen or seized at the time of the execution of
a cooperation request for arrest and surrender of the person, or very soon thereafter, it is likely that the
subsequent efforts of the Chamber, the Prosecution or the victims participating in the case will be fruitless
because existing technologymakes it possible for a person to placemost of his assets andmoveable property
beyond the Court’s reach in only a few days.’ See Order on the execution of the warrant of arrest against
Germain Katanga, supra n 120 at 5.
124 Article 21(3) Rome Statute.
125 Bemba, Kilolo, Kabongo, Babala and Arido ICC-01/05–01/13–1257, Decision on Kilolo Defence Motion
for Inadmissibility ofMaterial, Trial Chamber VII, 16 September 2015, at para 16, citing Article 17 ICCPR;
Article 8(1) ECHR; Article 11 ACHR; Article 21(1) Arab CHR.
126 Ibid. at paras 16–21. Trial Chamber VII also acknowledged (at n 22) that ‘Interference with this right is
subject to other requirements, such as the interference being “necessary in a democratic society in the
interests of national security, public safety or the economicwellbeing of the country”, but [stated that] there
[was] no argument in the Request that Mr Kilolo’s rights have been violated in these respects.’
127 Ibid. at para 16, citing Article 8(2) ECHR.
128 Bemba, Kilolo, Kabongo, Babala and Arido ICC-01/05–01/13–1485-Red, Decision on the ‘Requête de la
défense aux fins de levée du gel des avoirs de Monsieur Aimé Kilolo Musamba’, Trial Chamber VII, 17
November 2015, at paras 21–23.
129 Ibid. at para 21.
130 Judge Schmitt (ibid. at para 22) considered whether the freeze of Kilolo’s bank account ‘was taken in
accordance with the law and for a legitimate aim’. Judge Schmitt also took into account whether it was
‘proportionate vis-à-vis the legitimate aim pursued’. For an analysis of Judge Schmitt’s application of the
ECtHR’s case law, see Birkett, ‘Protective Measures for the Purpose of Forfeiture’, supra n 17 at 599–601.
131 Article 21(3) Rome Statute.
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References to regional human rights jurisprudence, which at the ICC most often
focus on judgments of the ECtHR,132 although understandable and offering a number
of benefits for the ICC’s case law,133 should be treated with caution.134 As Jones
observes:
The risk that reference to regional human rights jurisprudence could be used . . .
to the detriment of the accused . . . highlights the importance of clear reasoning
on the part of judges. To counter the risk of unfairness, it is important that judges
demonstrate awareness of the different functions of the ICC and regional human
rights courts in their reasoning, ensure compliance with the ICC’s provisions
on fair trial standards and provide a clear explanation of how human rights
jurisprudence is being used . . . 135.
Judge Schmitt could have more explicitly followed this final recommendation in decid-
ing on the violations alleged byMrKilolo. Although theECtHR’s approach to balancing
the application of protective measures with the right to respect for private and family
life was plainly followed, and the multiple reasons provided by Judge Schmitt for his
rejection of Kilolo’s request were clearly articulated, a more thorough explanation of
how the case law of the ECtHR (and, by reference, the IACtHR)136 was used would
have been beneficial to the parties in facilitating their understanding of the Court’s
reasoning. Adopting clear reasoning in this context could also serve to assist, in a
similarmanner, future parties to proceedings concerning the (un)freezing of assets. The
reasons for relying upon the jurisprudence of a particular regional human rights court
(for example, its expertise in international human rights issues),137 ought therefore to
132 See Jones, supra n 14 at 724 (analysing ‘the Court’s disproportionate number of references to the case law
of the ECtHR vis-à-vis other international, regional and domestic mechanisms’). Jones notes that during
the proceedings in Lubanga the 46 references made by the ICC to the case law of the ECtHR was ‘almost
double the number of references’ made to that of the IACtHR. Jones (at 725) justifies the ICC’s preference
as follows: ‘The length of the ECtHR’s operation and the quantity of relevant case law that it had produced
explains the disproportionate number of references to the ECtHR vis-à-vis the IACtHR’.
133 See Jones, ibid. at 704–6 (identifying benefits concerning the coherence of international law, the quality of
the Court’s case law, and the perceived legitimacy of the Court).
134 See ibid. at 706–8 (discussing the potential for the import of cultural bias and possible undesirable
consequences for the rights of the accused); Nerlich, ‘Article 21 (3) of the ICC Statute: Identifying and
Applying “Internationally Recognized Human Rights” ’ in Lobba and Mariniello (eds), Judicial Dialogue
on Human Rights: The Practice of International Criminal Tribunals (2017) at 84–5 (noting the case and
jurisdiction specific nature of the ECtHR’s case law).
135 Jones, ibid. at 708.
136 See Decision on the ‘Requête de la défense aux fins de levée du gel des avoirs de Monsieur Aimé Kilolo
Musamba’, supra n 128 at n 37, referring to ‘further references to human rights case law [including that of
the IACtHR] in related footnotes’ in Decision on Kilolo Defence Motion for Inadmissibility of Material,
supra n 125 at para 16.
137 SeeGeneuss, ‘Obstacles toCross-fertilisation: The International Criminal Tribunals’ ‘UniqueContext’ and
the Flexibility of the EuropeanCourt ofHumanRights’ Case Law’ (2015) 84Nordic Journal of International
Law 404 at 425–6.
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be made clear,138 not least ‘to allow the defence to make effective challenges where the
rights of the accused are at stake’.139
3. CONCLUSION
This article has sought to demonstrate that the freezing of individuals’ assets necessarily
infringes their fundamental human rights. Using the law and practice of the ECtHR
and IACtHR as a lens through which to ascertain the human rights implications of
asset freezing measures, the article shows that two specially affected rights are the
right to the peaceful enjoyment of one’s possessions and the right to respect for one’s
private and family life, home and correspondence. The article has also demonstrated
that the human rights repercussions of such measures have consequences for the ICC
and UNSC, both of which have the power to request States to freeze the assets of indi-
viduals. These States are also impacted by the Strasbourg and San José based Courts’
findings because it is their national authorities who carry out the asset freezes requested
by the ICC and UNSC. This is done in accordance with their respective domestic
implementing legislation. Council of Europe States, whose members constitute the
HighContracting Parties to the ECHR, and States Parties to the ACHR are particularly
impacted. This is because their national implementation of ICC or UNSC-requested
asset freezes could form the subject of a challenge before the Strasbourg Court, as in
the case of Nada v Switzerland, or the San José Court, respectively. It is not difficult
to envisage a similar complaint being brought with respect to a freeze requested by
the ICC. Indeed, the domestic execution of ICC-requested asset freezing measures has
been challenged in the domestic courts of at least oneCouncil of EuropeMember State:
Italy.140
The article has shown that a strict application of the human rights principles identi-
fied in the case law of the ECtHR and IACtHR could have implications for the length of
proceedings at, or at least the duration of asset freezingmeasures requested by, the ICC.
As for the UNSC, which rarely imposes open-ended targeted financial sanctions, to
strictly apply the principles developed in the jurisprudence of these two regional human
rights courts would require that all asset freezes it imposes underChapter VII of theUN
Charter be time limited. Other hurdles, namely that such measures are lawful, taken
in accordance with a legitimate aim and are proportionate, should not pose too high a
hurdle for States to overcome in executing ICC and UNSC-requested asset freezes in
their domestic legal orders. The same conclusion is applicable to the need for judicial
138 Geneuss (ibid.) proposes a two-step approach in this context, as follows: ‘Whenever faced with a human
rights issue [international criminal tribunals (ICTs)] . . . are obligated to consult ECtHR jurisprudence.
And only after a thorough review can ICTs decide whether they are persuaded by the ECtHR’s reasoning
or whether they want to deviate from and re-interpret the human rights standard. . . . In a second step,
ICTs look at the contents of ECtHR case law and can decide whether and how they want to translate the
ECtHR standard into their own context and whether the balance between, for example, fair trial and public
interest must be different, because of the different context in which ICTs operate. However, . . . ECtHR
case law carries the weight of “directory authority” [it ought to be followed, but can be outweighed] and
any deviation and differences in meaning must carefully be explained and justified.’
139 Jones, supra n 14 at 708.
140 SeeCorte di Appello di Roma (RomeCourt of Appeal), Sezione Quarta Penale,Ordinanza, N4/12 RGIE, 19
July 2012 (copy on file with author). Thanks to Dini Sejko for his assistance in finding this decision and
translating it from Italian into English.
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supervisionof suchmeasures and the requirement thatmanagement fees not be charged
to the individual who is subjected to the measures in question. This is because of the
widemarginof appreciation given toStateswhen executingmeasures that infringe upon
the rights under examination. As for prompt release, this principle has already proved
problematic at the ICC and could continue to do so if the division of labour between
it and the States responsible for freezing individuals’ assets is not clarified by the Court
in the course of adjudicating Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo’s claim for compensation and
damages for, inter alia, the alleged mismanagement of his frozen assets.
In its limited (publicly available) case law on the (continued) execution of asset
freezing measures requested by the ICC, the Court has given weight to the case law
of the ECtHR (and, to a noticeably lesser extent, that of the IACtHR) in determining
the compatibility of such measures with ‘internationally recognised human rights’
in accordance with Article 21(3) of its constituent instrument. This practice, albeit
justifiable in view of the authority of the Strasbourg and San José courts, nonetheless
presents certain challenges, particularly in terms of the concerns raised about the lack
of clear reasoning provided by the ICCwhen referring to the case lawof regional human
rights courts. Consequently, while advocating that both the ICC and its States Parties
acting at its request ought to pay close attention to this case lawwith a view to respecting
the human rights of those to whom asset freezing measures are applied, it is equally
important that the reasons behind such reliance are clearly expressed to the parties.
To adopt such an approach could serve to render the legal framework applicable to
ICC-requested asset freezingmeasuresmore ‘accessible and foreseeable’141 and, in turn,
more ‘consistent with internationally recognised human rights’.
141 Huvig v France Application No 11105/84, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 24 April 1990, at para 26 (‘The
expression “in accordance with the law”, within the meaning of Article 8 § 2 (art. 8–2), requires firstly that
the impugned measure should have some basis in domestic law; it also refers to the quality of the law in
question, requiring that it should be accessible to the person concerned, who must moreover be able to
foresee its consequences for him, and compatible with the rule of law.’). See also Sluiter, supra n 8 at 466.
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